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We test the eﬀect of diﬀerent combinations of parties ruling the
central and regional governments on regional economic growth. If such
an eﬀect exists, it should accrue through the total factor productivity
(TFP). Using panel data regression for the Spanish regions over the
1989-2004 period with TFP growth rate as an endogenous variable, we
ﬁnd no eﬀect. We go further and propose a simultaneous two-equation
model with the growth rates of TFP and public infrastructure as en-
dogenous variables, ﬁnding indirect eﬀects of some combinations of
parties on TFP through the provision of public infrastructure. The
main ﬁnding is that in central left-wing governments without a major-
ity, a positive indirect eﬀect arises in self-governed regions. However,
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s when central left-wing governments have a majority, negative indirect
eﬀects arise in regions governed by regional parties. Our results are
robust to diﬀerent methods of estimations and measures of TFP.
Key words: Growth Accounting, Panel Data, Federalism, TFP.





























In a country with multiple governance levels, the involved governments are
responsible for the eﬀective connection and good performance of their insti-
tutions, which can be deﬁned as rules and organs that drive the production
atmosphere and are supposed to inﬂuence factor productivities. Evidence re-
lating quality of institutions and economic growth can be found in Hall and
Jones (1999)1 and Rodrick et al. (2004), among others. In their approach,
the quality of institutions is measured by an indicator that accounts for the
role of the government in law, order and property rights protection, as well
as capturing bureaucracy, corruption, risk of expropriation and government
repudiation of contracts quality. Their results stress that one of the main
factors explaining the poor performance of developing countries is the quality
of institutions, while developed countries enjoy consolidated institutions.
Unlike the above authors, we address another question. We consider a
developed country assumed to have qualiﬁed institutions as deﬁned by these
authors and focus on political institutions. Deﬁn e di nb r o a dt e r m s ,p o l i t i c a l
institutions include political parties, electoral rules and governance levels.
Speciﬁcally, we are interested in analyzing the eﬀe c t st h a tc o m b i n a t i o n so f
parties ruling diﬀerent levels of government could have on regional economic
growth. We consider a federalist country at two levels of governance, each of
1Hall and Jones use social infrastructure deﬁned as institutions and government policies
that determine the economic environment within which individuals accumulate skills and




























s which is characterized by a parliamentary system (central and the regional
parliaments) and whose representatives are elected democratically through
electoral processes. Which party governs depends on the composition of the
parliament. Thus, when there are at least two parties, mixed governance (i.e.
diﬀerent parties governing at each level of government) is practically ensured
in at least one region.
Our work could be framed in the literature on Partisan Theory which
states that political parties have diﬀerent preferences over macroeconomic
goals. The seminal work of Hibbs (1977) showed that in Western European
and North American nations, left-wing governments are more concerned with
low unemployment, while right-wing governments are more concerned with
low inﬂation. Alesina (1987) and Alesina and Sachs (1988) conﬁrm Hibbs’
results for the US case. Using data on OECD countries, Alesina and Roubini
(1992) found that in the short run (about two years) left-wing governments
expand the economy when elected. However, no support for permanent ef-
fects on real economy was found. MidtbØ (1999) found that left-wing govern-
ments in the United States, Britain and Canada have reinforced the growth
of both public spending and GNP. Recently, Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) found
f o rS w e d e nt h a tl e f t - w i n gg o v e r n m e n t sl o w e rt h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t eb yi n -
creasing public employment and spending and taxing more than right-wing
governments. Therefore, the empirical evidence reveals that the higher eco-





























We go further as we are interested in testing whether ideological com-
binations at the diﬀerent levels of government could have an eﬀect on the
economic growth of regions in a particular country. Diﬀerences in time might
arise in the relationships between the two levels of government involved due to
commitments, arrangements or disagreements. Speciﬁcally with mixed gov-
ernance, disagreements about certain projects are more likely to arise as a
result of the diﬀerent points of view, political objectives and priorities of each
political party. In fact, individual regional aspirations, major infrastructure
projects or even environmental laws and the justice administration could de-
pend on the combinations of parties in the central and regional governments.
However, mixed governance has the advantage that it may function as a
useful mechanism to prevent arbitrariness.
O u rg o a li si n t e r e s t i n gn o to n l ya tt h er e g i o n a ll e v e l ,b u ta l s oa tt h e
European level due to the resurgence of regional policy to reduce disparities
b e t w e e nE u r o p e a nr e g i o n s . 2 Given that, as far as we know, studies assessing
the impact of mixed governance on economic growth are inexistent in the
literature, our aim is to open a path with the purpose of ﬁlling this vacuum.
Our results could be interpreted as a measure of consensus between diﬀerent
levels of government, i.e. among parties and their eﬀects on the economy.
2The regional policy of the European Union seeks to promote the reduction of structural
diﬀerences between the regions of the EU, the balanced development of the community




























s In this paper, we consider the Spanish case at two levels of government:
the central level and the regional level. We focus on part of the democratic
period and all the autonomous communities of Spain.3 During the period in
question, we basically ﬁnd three kinds of parties which we have classiﬁed as
right, left and regional.
T oa c h i e v et h i sa i m ,w ep e r f o r mag r o w t ha c c o u n t i n ge x e r c i s ea tt h e
regional level to analyze the factors that explain economic growth across
regions and to obtain the evolution of total factor productivity (TFP). We
assume that the eﬀect of political institutions on economic growth accrues
through TFP. Hence, this is the endogenous variable in our analysis, and for
which we have speciﬁed a particular function form to perform econometric
estimations.
Firstly, in our empirical estimations, we rely on panel data regression
controlling for individual eﬀects, economic structure of the regions, a health-
care indicator and public infrastructure. Dummy variables are introduced to
capture combinations of parties ruling the diﬀerent levels of government.
Our ﬁr s tr e s u l t ss h o wt h a ti) none of the combinations of parties at either
level of government has an eﬀect on the TFP growth rate, ii) the growth rate
of public infrastructure does have a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the TFP
growth rate, in line with Aschauer (1989) for the US case.
Secondly, we hypothesize that the provision of infrastructure could also be
3Autonomous communities refers to a set of territories that do not all share the same




























s aﬀected by political arrangements, disagreements or commitments between
the regional and central governments. Therefore, we estimate a simulta-
neous two-equation model with the variables TFP growth rate and public
infrastructure growth rate as endogenous variables. Again, we ﬁnd no eﬀect
of the combinations of parties on TFP growth rate. However, we do ﬁnd a
positive eﬀect of the growth rate of public infrastructure on the growth rate
of TFP.M o r e o v e r ,iii) signiﬁcant eﬀects of some combinations of parties on
the growth rate of public infrastructure were found. Therefore, we claim that
combinations of parties in the diﬀerent levels of government have indirect ef-
fects on TFP through the provision of public infrastructure. Speciﬁcally, our
main ﬁnding is that when the left party is in both levels of governments, but
does not hold a majority in the central government, there is a signiﬁcant pos-
itive eﬀect on public infrastructure in self-governed regions. However, when
it does hold a majority, negative eﬀects are found in regions governed by
regional parties. Therefore, doubts arise about the consolidation of political
institutions in Spain.
Our results are robust to diﬀerent methods of estimation and measures
of TFP.
The article is organized as follows. An overview of the Spanish political
system is presented in the following section. The growth accounting exercise
is shown in section 3. The econometric model and estimations are described




























s 2 An Overview of the Spanish Political Sys-
tem
Governance levels: Administrative Divisions
(i) Central Government
Spain, or the Kingdom of Spain, has a constitutional monarchy with a
hereditary monarch and a bicameral parliament known as the Cortes Gen-
erales. The executive branch consists of a Council of Ministers presided
over by the President of the Government (comparable to a prime minister),
who is elected by National Assembly legislative elections and proposed by
the monarch. The Constitution of 1978 sets up the framework by which
the country evolves and explicitly states the indivisible unity of the Spanish
nation.
The Spanish nation is structured into what is known as the Estado de
las Autonomías (State of Autonomies), thus creating a unique system of re-
gional autonomy. Spain is one of the most decentralized countries in Europe,
alongside Switzerland, Germany and Belgium.
(ii) Autonomous communities
An autonomous community is the ﬁrst-level political division of the King-
dom of Spain as established under the Spanish Constitution of 1978; which




























s comprises 17 autonomous communities and two autonomous cities with vary-
ing degrees of autonomy.
The autonomous communities enjoy broad legislative and executive au-
tonomy through their own parliaments and regional governments. The dis-
tribution of powers may vary in each community as laid out in the basic in-
stitutional law on autonomous communities, the Estatuto de las Autonomías
(Statutes of Autonomy). All autonomous communities have their own elected
parliaments, governments, public administrations, budgets and resources. As
a result, their health and education systems, among others, are managed re-
gionally. Furthermore, some communities also retain their economic and
ﬁscal autonomy based on foral provisions allowing them to manage their
own public ﬁn a n c e sa n dh a v et h e i ro w nf u l l - r a n g ep o l i c ef o r c e sw h i c hr e p l a c e
some of the functions of the state police corps. This assignation of functions
at the regional level is known as the Concierto Económico.
The autonomous communities of Spain are4 Andalusia, Aragon, the Prin-
cipality of Asturias, the Balearic Islands, the Basque Country, the Canary
Islands, Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha, Castile and Leon, Catalonia, Ex-
tremadura, Galicia, La Rioja, Madrid, Murcia, Navarre and Valencia.
(iii) Provinces and Municipalities
The Spanish Constitution recognizes, grants and protects two subdivi-
4Between 1979 and 1983, all the regions of Spain were established as autonomous
communities. The process concluded in 1996 when Ceuta and Melilla gained autonomous




























s sions within the autonomous communities of Spain. As such, the provincias
(provinces) serve as the local territorial building blocks for the former (the
framework under which the autonomous communities were created). In turn,
the provinces are divided into municipios (municipalities). Municipalities are
granted autonomy to manage their internal aﬀairs, while provinces are the
territorial divisions designed to carry out the activities of the state.
Today, Spain is divided into 52 provinces and 8111 municipalities. A
province is a self-governing territory, which is led by a provincial council
in communities with more than one province. Provincial councils have no
legislative authority, but exercise certain executive functions. On the other
hand, municipalities are the basic level of local government in Spain. The
governance of municipalities is the responsibility of city councils, whose high-
e s ta u t h o r i t yi st h em a y o r .T h ef u n c t i o n sc a r r i e do u tb yt h e s el o c a lb o d i e s
are considered to be in closest proximity to citizens.
In sum, each municipality forms part of a province, which in turn forms
a part or the whole of an autonomous community.
Political System
Spain’s political system resembles a two-party system insofar as there are
two dominant political parties, making it relatively diﬃcult for political rep-
resentatives to achieve electoral success under the banner of any other party.




























s communities such as Catalonia and the Basque Country and are essential for
government coalitions or parliamentary majorities, thus transforming Spain’s
two-party system into a multi-party system.
An example of Spain’s political parties include i) National parties in
the Cortes Generales: Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido Socialista
Obrero Español or PSOE), which includes its regional representatives in
Catalonia (PSC), the Basque Country (PSE) and Valencia (PSPV); Peo-
ple’s Party (Partido Popular or PP) including its regional representative in
Navarre (UPN); United Left (Izquierda Unida or IU) with its regional rep-
resentatives in Catalonia (EUiA) and the Basque Country (EB) and ii)R e -
gional parties in the Cortes Generales: Convergence and Union (Convergèn-
cia i Unió or CiU); Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), Galician Nationalist
Bloc (BNG), Chunta Aragonesista (CHA) and Canarian Coalition (CC).
Electoral Processes
General and regional elections are typically held at four-year intervals
with some exceptions. In our sample period general elections were held in
1989, 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2004. Regional elections took place in Aragon,
Asturias, the Balearic Islands, the Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castile-La
Mancha, Castile-Leon, Valencia, Extremadura, La Rioja, Madrid, Murcia
and Navarre on the same day in 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2003. Andalusia held




























s 1994, 1998 and 2002; Galicia in 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2001; and Catalonia
in 1988, 1992, 1995, 1999 and 2003. The particular features of the Spanish
electoral and party system mean that the elections held at each layer of
government depend on the other layers. Thus, parties have a special interest
in the results of regional elections since they provide an opportunity to test
the real prospects of a given party. Indeed, campaign eﬀorts could drive a
p a r t yt ou s et h ev a r i o u sp o s t si tc o n t r o l sa td i ﬀerent layers of government to
allocate resources in order to pursue its electoral objectives. The high degree
of partisan control facilitates the use of resources coming from diﬀerent posts
to achieve party interests.
3 Growth Accounting
In this section a growth accounting exercise for the 1988-2004 period is used
with a twofold objective: to estimate the evolution of TFP in the Spanish
regions and to analyze the factors that explain the long-run growth experi-
ence.
We consider the standard assumptions about technology represented by
an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function and about input markets,
capital and labor, which are given by perfect competition. The representative


































s during period t provided by the National Statistics Institute of Spain (INE).
Kit is stock of non-residential productive physical capital in region i during
period t based on statistics provided by the BBVA Foundation and the Eco-
nomic Research Institute of Valencia (IVIE).5 Lit is the number of employees
in region i during period t a c c o r d i n gt os t a t i s t i c so ft h eB a n c a j aF o u n d a t i o n
and IVIE, and Ait is a measure of the total factor productivity (TFP).6
Moreover, we assume a speciﬁc aggregate production function with labor






where Bit is the TFP when labor is adjusted for human capital and Nit
denotes the amount of human capital-augmented labor used in production






where j =0 ,1,2,3,4 is levels of education, xj is years of each educational
level7 and φj is the rate of return to schooling (known as the Mincer index,
1974) from Lassibille and Navarro (1998).
Regarding the choice of labor share series, 1 − αit, for the autonomous
communities of Spain, we do not only consider the published series of wages
5The Yit and Kit series are referred to in constant euros with base year 2000.
6Ait is a good approximation to the neutral technical progress using growth accounting
in a non-parametric context.
7We assume the middle point of each range of years of schooling, which are assumed




























s because they might be underestimated if they are not adjusted to include
self-employed and family workers. We use the measure proposed by María-
Dolores and Puigcerver (2005) in order to correct for this bias.8
Given our choice of series for output Yit,l a b o rLit, productive physical
capital Kit, capital share αit, years of schooling xj a n dr a t eo fr e t u r nt os c h oo l -
ing φj, we calculate the growth rate of TFP through the Divisia-Tornqvist
index as follows,






(1 − αit)+( 1− αit−1)
2
∆Log(Nit)
and ∆ is the incremental operator, the log diﬀerentials are growth rates.
I no r d e rt op e r f o r mag r o w t ha c c o u n t i n ge x e r c i s ef o rt h ei Spanish region
and given that Yit is homogenous of degree one with respect to the factors,
the production function can be expressed in per worker terms as,
yit = Bit (kit)
α (hit)
1−α ,
where yit = Yit/Lit is output per worker, kit = Kit/Lit is physical capital
p e rw o r k e ra n dhit = Nt
Lt is human capital per worker.





























s This speciﬁcation allows us to decompose diﬀerences in output per worker
across regions in Spain over period t to t+s in the contribution of the changes
in TFP, physical capital per worker and human capital per worker,9
(Log (yit+s) − Log (yit))
s
=











(1 − αit+s)+( 1− αit)
2
¶
(Log(hit+s) − Log (hit))
s
Table 1 shows the results of a standard growth accounting exercise per-
formed for the Spanish economy for the 1988-2004 period, as well as for two
speciﬁc subperiods: left-wing government, 1988-1996; and right-wing gov-
ernment, 1996-2004. These results give rise to two particular features about
sources of growth which diﬀer from other works on Spanish regions since
physical capital refers to productive capital and the labor factor is a measure
adjusted for human capital. In general in the overall period, the Spanish
growth experience of output per worker was chieﬂy due to changes in the
physical capital, kit, rather than to changes in the total factor productiv-
ity, Bit.10 B yp e r i o d ,i ti si n t e r e s t i n gt on o t et h eb e t t e re c o n o m i cb e h a v i o r
9We performed another growth accounting exercise following Hayashi and Prescott
(2002) who speciﬁed the capital-output ratio rather than the capital-labor ratio. The
results of our exercise do not change signiﬁcantly. However, they are not shown since our
interest is not to measure the contribution of deviations from balanced growth behavior.
They are available upon request.
10These results are in line with the literature on growth regarding the deﬁnition of




























s of left-wing governments which have an annual output per worker growth
rate of 1.52 percent, in contrast to right-wing governments, which is 0.07
percent. Notice that although the annual growth rates of inputs are posi-
tive, they are higher in left-wing governments and changes in TFP are more
negative in right-wing governments, i.e. in the earlier period there was sig-
niﬁcantly more physical and human capital accumulation. In particular, the
1.62 percent change in human capital over the 1988-1996 period explains the
economic behavior more accurately than the 1.08 percent change in physical
capital. In the 1996-2004 period, the growth of output per worker is chieﬂy
accounted for by changes in physical capital of 0.28 percent.
A regional-level picture is drawn in Figure 1. All the Spanish regions show
positive average annual growth rates of productivity and negative average
annual growth rates of TFP during the period under consideration. Physical
and human capital increased at positive rates, with a greater increase found
in labor adjusted for human capital.
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4 Econometric Estimations
4.1 Benchmark Model
Let us specify a function for the TFP of region i in time t as
Bit = Bit−1f (δi,SI it,hc it,k
pu
it ,D it,ε it) (1)
Where δi is a speciﬁcr e g i o ne ﬀect (ﬁxed eﬀect), SIit is a specialization
index as speciﬁed by Alvarez (2007) that accounts for the diﬀerent economic
s t r u c t u r eo ft h er e g i o n sw i t hr e s p e c tt ot h ew h o l ec o u n t r y .
hcit is an indicator of the healthcare system in region i. Cole and Neu-
mayer (2006) found a negative impact of poor health on TFP. A good
healthcare system is related to healthy people, i.e. more productive work-































it is a variable accounting for public infrastructure per eﬃcient worker.
Aschauer (1989) found a positive relationship between public capital stock
and TFP for the United States. It is argued that poor infrastructure is one of
the factors that may explain lowest per capita income and disparities in levels
of productivity across the European regions. In this regard, the provision
of infrastructure under the EU’s regional policy has played a central role in
reducing disparities in levels of productivity and per capita income in regions
of the European Union.12 Therefore, we consider "core infrastructure" per
eﬃcient worker in k
pu
it , which includes streets and highways, water systems,
railways, airports, ports and other urban infrastructures provided by local
governments.13
Dit is a vector of variables collecting the diﬀerent combinations of parties
ruling both levels of government and εit is an iid disturbance.
Let us deﬁne an explicit function form for (1) allowing Bit to evolve
according to the following equation
11Data on hospital beds in the regions are taken from the INE.
12Founded on the concepts of solidarity and economic cohesion, this policy will ma-
terialize through various ﬁnancial measures, in particular those of the Structural Funds
and the Cohesion Fund. In 1986, the Single European Act introduced the objective of
economic and social cohesion. Finally, the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) incorporated this
policy into the EC Treaty (Articles 158 to 162). For the 2007-2013 period, regional policy
is the second largest budget item of the European Union, with a strength of 348 billion
euros.
13These correspond to the classiﬁcation by asset 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 according














































In our environment, right and left parties can hold oﬃce in both central
and regional governments. However, regional parties can only be in charge of
regional governments. Let us deﬁne the People’s Party (PP) as a right party,
and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) as a left party.14 Let R
(L)b ead u m m yv a r i a b l et h a tt a k e st h ev a l u eo fo n ew h e nt h er i g h t( l e f t )
party is in the central government, and zero otherwise. And let r,l,n be
dummy variables that take the value of one when the right, left and regional
parties respectively govern the i autonomous community, and zero otherwise.
By constructing the interaction of dummies, we can specify the vector that
collects the combinations of parties
Dit =( Rrit,Ll it,Rl it,Lr it,Rn it,Rl it,MR t,ML t)
0
Where Rrit (Llit) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when
the right (left) party simultaneously holds oﬃce at both levels of government,
and zero otherwise; Rlit (Lrit)i sad u m m yv a r i a b l et h a tt a k e st h ev a l u eo f
o n ew h e nt h er i g h t( l e f t )p a r t yi si nt h ec e n t r a lg o v e r n m e n ta n dt h el e f t
(right) party is in the regional government, and zero otherwise; and Rnit
14Although the two main parties in Spain lean towards the center, we can unambigously
classify the People’s Party as a right-wing party, and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party




























s (Lnit)i sad u m m yv a r i a b l et h a tt a k e st h ev a l u eo fo n ew h e nt h er i g h t( l e f t )
party is in the central government and a regional party is in the regional
government, and zero otherwise.15 We also introduce the variables MRt and
MLt w h i c ha r ed u m m yv a r i a b l e st h a tt a k et h ev a l u eo fo n ew h e nt h er i g h t
and left party holds a majority in the central government, and zero otherwise.
These dummy variables allow us to control for the possibility of negotiation
between central and regional governments headed by diﬀerent parties. In line
with common political practice, when central governments lack a majority,
they are willing to make concessions to regional governments in order to gain
support to pass a law, the national budget, a foreign mission, etc. In fact, the
Spanish experience shows that regional parties can play a key role in forming
the central government when a majority is not reached. On the contrary,
when the central government holds a majority, they do not need partners
and have no reason to negotiate in order to bring forward a proposal.
Taking natural logarithm in (2), we obtain the equation to be estimated
4Log (Bit)=δi + β1Rrit + β2Llit + β3Rlit + β4Lrit + β5Rnit + β6Lnit





+θ3 4 Log (k
pu
it )+εit (3)
Although we will rely on panel data regression, we ﬁrst present the results
15Notice that the ﬁrst year of governance does not cover the whole year. Therefore if in
the ﬁrst year of governance the party took oﬃce before June, this variable takes the value




























s of a pooled regression in Table 2. The results of the estimation are obtained
for both measures of TFP (At and Bt).16 Similar results were found for both
measures of TFP at a 5% signiﬁcance level. The more specialized the region,
the higher the growth of TFP. According to the general literature and to
the literature speciﬁcally related to Spain, the estimation of the parameters
that collect the eﬀects of the healthcare system and public infrastructure is
positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level and is higher when TFP is
adjusted for human capital. Using data from the autonomous communities
of Spain, Alonso and Serén Freire (2002) showed positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀects of both parameters on the increments of total factor productivity
and argue that this may partly explain regional diﬀerences in Spain. Aviles
et al. (2001) suggest that public capital accumulation can be considered
a tool for improving the competitiveness of Spanish ﬁrms since it reduces
production costs. Along the same lines, Mas et al. (1996), Salinas-Jimenez
(2003) and Álvarez and Delgado (2004) conﬁrm that there is a signiﬁcant
positive contribution of infrastructure on both private production and the
eﬃciency of Spanish regions.
As regards our variables of interest, none of the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant
at the 5% level. This result could be explained intuitively in the following
manner. If major structural economic reforms or changes in economic policy
did not occur during the period in question, there is no reason to expect a




























s signiﬁcant eﬀect of party combinations on TFP. In fact, the Spanish expe-
rience shows that major changes in economic policy took place in the early
eighties to modernize the economy and fulﬁl lt h er e q u i r e m e n t sf o rE u r o p e a n
Union adhesion.
Table 3 shows the estimation results of the panel regression using the
least squares dummy variable approach (LSDV) to estimate the individual
ﬁxed eﬀects which are not shown for reasons of space. The results remain
practically the same with respect to the pooled regression. We report the F-
test (F1) of null hypothesis of joint signiﬁcance of the individual ﬁxed eﬀects
and are unable to reject it (p-values in parentheses). It is also striking that
when TFP is adjusted for human capital, the model is able to explain about
53% of the variability of the TFP growth rate.
4.2 An Extended Model
In this subsection we hypothesize that public infrastructure could also be af-
fected by the diﬀerent combinations of parties in the two levels of government.
Our intuition is that the growth of productive public capital could depend
on political arrangements or disagreements between the diﬀerent government
levels. Core infrastructure might take years of discussion before being imple-
mented because of the diﬀerent interests and points of view of the involved
governance levels. The central government could even favor regional gov-




























s or the two levels of government may simply agree or disagree about under-
taking public infrastructure projects. In fact, Castells and Solé-Ollé (2005)
estimated an equation of infrastructure investment allocation for Spain ac-
counting for political factors. Their results suggest that political factors
explain the regional allocation of infrastructure.
We propose a simpler speciﬁcation for the evolution of the growth rate of



















k < 1 (4)
where ˆ k
pu
it is the optimal level of public infrastructure per eﬃcient worker,
γk is the adjustment coeﬃcient and εk
it is an iid random disturbance. Let us
specify ˆ k
pu








i is a constant term. We also allow the economic structure of the
region to play a role in public capital accumulation.
Notice that whenever D0
itβ
k =0 ,n oe ﬀect of combination of parties on
public infrastructure accumulation is implied. Therefore, in the extreme case
of γk =1 , the public infrastructure of a regional economy can only deviate
from its optimal level due to a random disturbance and we would have that
the expected value of public infrastructure equals its optimal level, E (k
pu
it )=


































it−1, we expect no growth in public
infrastructure. On the contrary, if D0
itβ
k 6=0and γk =1 , the economy can
deviate from the optimal level of public infrastructure due to the random






If γk =0 , the expected public infrastructure level could grow or decrease due





























































































1 Rrit + β
B
2 Llit + β
B
3 Rlit + β
B
4 Lrit + β
B





7 MRt + β
B
8 MLt + θ
B


















































s Notice that the simultaneous two-equation model is a triangular system.
Assuming that the disturbances of each equation are not correlated, i.e. a
diagonal covariance matrix, we can estimate the model recursively through
OLS. It is known that under such assumptions the OLS equation by equation
produces consistent and asynthotically eﬃcient estimators since it is identical
to the full information maximum likelihood estimator.
Table 4 shows the LSDV estimation for the ﬁrst equation of the system
(7). We present results for public infrastructure per worker (K
pu
it /Lit) and
public infrastructure per eﬃcient worker (K
pu
it /Nit). Notice that for both
measures we ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of some combinations of parties. There-
fore, unlike TFP, public infrastructure is sensitive to combinations of parties
in the diﬀerent levels of government. In fact, we have found that when the left
party holds oﬃce simultaneously in both level of governments and does not
have a majority in the central government, a positive eﬀect arises on public
infrastructure accumulation. This result is in line with the general literature
on Partisan Theory and speciﬁc a l l yw i t ht h em o r er e c e n te v i d e n c eo fM i d t b Ø
(1999) and Pettersson-Lidbom (2008), who found that growth of GDP was
reinforced under left-wing governments due to higher spending. Our regional
analysis allows us to say something more since our ﬁnding suggests that the
higher spending on public infrastructure associated with left-wing govern-
ments does not beneﬁt the whole country, but seems to be aimed at favoring




























s implies a negative eﬀect on public infrastructure accumulation. We therefore
test the hypothesis of signiﬁcance of combinations of parties when the left
















As can be observed in the second panel of Table 4, we do not reject H1 and
H2, but do reject H3 at the 5% signiﬁcance level (p- values in parentheses).
Therefore, according to the value of the estimates, the Spanish experience
s h o w st h a tw h e nal e f t - w i n gc e n t r a lg o v e r n m e n te n j o y sam a j o r i t y ,t h e r ei sa
negative eﬀect on the provision of public infrastructure in regions governed
by regional parties.
Since we have found that some combinations of parties aﬀect 4Log(k
pu
it )
a n dt h i si nt u r na ﬀects 4Log (Bit), we can say that there is an indirect eﬀect
of combinations of parties on TFP accruing through the provision of public
infrastructure.
It is also noticeable in Table 4 that the estimate of coeﬃcient γk is sig-
niﬁcant at the 5% level and positive and less than one, thus ﬁtting the re-
quirement of our model. Incidentally, due to its low value, we can say that
Spanish regions are far from the optimal level of public infrastructure.




























s esis of joint signiﬁcance of the individual ﬁxed eﬀects for both measures of
public infrastructure growth rate. In this case we reject the null hypothesis
of no ﬁxed eﬀe c ta tt h e5 %l e v e lf o rb o t hm e a s u r e so fk
pu
it . Therefore, indi-
vidual ﬁxed eﬀects do account for the growth rate of public infrastructure.
We also provide the F-test (F2) of null hypothesis of homogeneous individual
ﬁxed eﬀe c t sa n dr e j e c ti ta tt h es a m el e v e lo fs i g n i ﬁcance. Therefore, Spain
exhibits a heterogeneous individual ﬁxed eﬀect in the growth rate of public
capital across regions.
Not fulﬁlling the assumption of diagonal covariance matrix of distur-
bances would imply inconsistent OLS estimations. Therefore, we can al-
ternatively relax the assumption of diagonal covariance matrix and use the
GLS estimator which produces consistent and eﬃcient estimators as shown
by Lahiri and Schmidt (1978). They pointed out that a system like (7) can
be estimated as a seemingly unrelated equation model.
Table 5 shows that these results are not very diﬀerent from the above
ones. We also report Wald tests of H1, H2 and H3 and of the null hypotheses
of joint signiﬁcance and homogeneous individual ﬁxed eﬀects (W1 and W2).
Similar results were obtained for both measures of the TFP growth rate and
the public infrastructure growth rate. Therefore, our results are robust to
diﬀerent methods of estimation and diﬀerent measures of TFP.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we have found no direct




























s growth rate of public infrastructure positively aﬀects the growth rate of TFP.
Third, we have found that certain combinations of parties aﬀect the growth
rate of public infrastructure. Therefore, we claim that the combinations
of parties have a signiﬁcant indirect eﬀect on TFP through the provision
of public infrastructure. Therefore, doubts arise about the consolidation of
political institutions in Spain.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this article we test the eﬀect of diﬀerent combinations of parties ruling the
central and regional governments on the economic growth of Spanish regions.
We assume that this eﬀect, if indeed it exists, should accrue through the to-
tal factor productivity (TFP). Therefore, we perform a growth accounting
exercise to obtain the TFP growth rate series for the Spanish regions. After
specifying a functional form for TFP, we estimate a panel data regression
model controlling for individual ﬁxed eﬀects, specialization of the regions,
healthcare system and public infrastructure. In an initial stage we found
that i) combinations of parties have no direct eﬀe c to nt h eg r o w t hr a t eo f
TFP. However, in line with previous literature, we have found that ii)
the growth rate of public infrastructure positively aﬀects the growth rate of
TFP. In a second stage we hypothesize that public infrastructure can also
be aﬀected by combinations of parties in the diﬀerent levels of government,




























s disagreements between these levels. Therefore, we estimate a simultaneous
two-equation model using public infrastructure and TFP growth rates as en-
dogenous variables, ﬁnding that iii) combinations of parties have an indirect
eﬀect on the growth rate of TFP accruing through the public infrastructure.
Moreover, our main ﬁnding is that under left-wing central governments
without a majority, a positive eﬀect arises on public infrastructure accumu-
lation in regions governed by the left party, i.e. left-wing governments favor
regions governed by their same party. Additionally, under left-wing central
governments with a majority, a negative eﬀect arises in regions governed by
regional parties. Therefore, doubts arise about the consolidation of political
institutions in Spain.






























The equation system in the structural form with two endogenous vari-
ables, n + g exogenous variables, n individuals and T observations for each
individual can be written as








































⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
T×2



































































































































































































































































































From our speciﬁcation in (7), it turns out that θ
k
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Table 1: Spain’s Growth Accounting
Average Annual Changes (%)
1988-2004 1988-1996 1996-2004
g(yit) 0.79 1.52 0.07
due to g(kit) 0.71 1.08 0.28
due to g(hit) 1.45 1.62 1.33
due to g(Bit) -1.37 -1.19 -1.54
Source: Authors’ calculations
Table 2: Pooled Regression for the growth rate of TFP
4Log (Ait) 4Log (Bit)
Coeﬃcient Std Error Coeﬃcient Std Error
Constant -0.0005 0.0049 -0.0067 0.0054
Rr 0.0023 0.0051 0.0038 0.0056
Ll 0.0072 0.0050 0.0045 0.0055
Rl 0.0008 0.0059 0.0036 0.0065
Lr 0.0040 0.0054 0.0016 0.0060
Rn -0.0007 0.0059 0.0033 0.0066
Ln 0.0047 0.0057 0.0028 0.0063
MR 0.0022 0.0031 0.0022 0.0034
ML 0.0014 0.0031 0.0020 0.0034






0.1449 * 0.0346 0.2327 * 0.0362
4Log (k
pu
it ) 0.0749 ** 0.0322 0.1256 * 0.0349
DW 1.9513 1.9384
R2 0.2272 0.4944





























Table 3: Panel Data Regression with Individual Fixed Eﬀect for the growth
rate of TFP
4Log (Ait) 4Log (Bit)
Coeﬃcient Std Error Coeﬃcient Std Error
Rr -0.0034 0.0066 -0.0010 0.0073
Ll 0.0021 0.0061 -0.0002 0.0068
Rl -0.0064 0.0077 -0.0017 0.0085
Lr -0.0020 0.0073 -0.0043 0.0080
Rn -0.0035 0.0086 0.0068 0.0094
Ln 0.0002 0.0076 0.0035 0.0085
MR 0.0025 0.0031 0.0021 0.0035
ML 0.0011 0.0031 0.0018 0.0034






0.1452 * 0.0355 0.2338 * 0.0371
4Log (k
pu
it ) 0.0757 ** 0.0335 0.1378 * 0.0361
DW 2.0668 2.0405
R2 0.2802 0.5278
F1 1.0574 (0.3970) 1.1036 (0.3505)





























Table 4: Panel Data Regression with Individual Fixed Eﬀect for the growth















Coeﬃcient Std Error Coeﬃcient Std Error
Rr -0.0068 0.0131 -0.0021 0.0145
Ll 0.0253 ** 0.0119 0.0268 ** 0.0131
Rl -0.0085 0.0153 -0.0004 0.0169
Lr 0.0170 0.0142 0.0196 0.0157
Rn -0.0294 0.0169 -0.0157 0.0186
Ln -0.0008 0.0150 0.0062 0.0166
MR 0.0035 0.0061 0.0042 0.0068
ML -0.0331 * 0.0082 -0.0436 * 0.0088








0.1993 * 0.0328 0.2507 * 0.0307
H1 0.3086 (0.5790) 1.1774 (0.2790)
H2 0.9773 (0.3238) 1.7624 (0.1856)
H3 4.1407 (0.0429) 4.1089 (0.0437)
DW 1.8725 1.7973
R2 0.6059 0.4449
F1 5.0328 (0.0000) 5.0075 (0.0000)
F2 4.8094 (0.0000) 5.2848 (0.0000)





























Table 5: Simultaneous Equation Regression with Individual Fixed Eﬀect for
the growth rates Public Infrastructure and TFP















Coef. St Error Coef. St Error Coef. St Error Coef. St Error
Rr -0.0033 0.0062 -0.0068 0.0125 -0.0010 0.0069 -0.0021 0.0138
Ll 0.0020 0.0058 0.0253 ** 0.0113 0.0001 0.0064 0.0268 ** 0.0125
Rl -0.0062 0.0073 -0.0085 0.0146 -0.0018 0.0080 -0.0004 0.0161
Lr -0.0020 0.0069 0.0170 0.0135 -0.0043 0.0076 0.0196 0.0149
Rn -0.0033 0.0081 -0.0294 0.0160 0.0068 0.0089 -0.0157 0.0176
Ln 0.0002 0.0072 -0.0008 0.0143 0.0035 0.0080 -0.0062 0.0158
MR 0.0024 0.0030 0.0035 0.0058 0.0021 0.0033 0.0042 0.0064
ML 0.0011 0.0029 -0.0331 * 0.0077 0.0018 0.0033 -0.0436 * 0.0084






0.1450 * 0.0336 0.2338 * 0.0351
4Log (k
pu








0.1994 * 0.0273 0.2507 * 0.0291
H1 0.3435 (0.5578) 1.3072 (0.2529)
H2 1.0861 (0.2973) 1.9567 (0.1619)
H3 4.5991 (0.0320) 4.5618 (0.0327)
DW 2.0653 1.8725 2.0410 1.7973
R2
0.2801 0.6059 0.5278 0.4449
W1 20.0539 (0.2715) 95.0156 (0.0000) 20.8813 (0.2316) 94.5097 (0.0000)
W2 20.0371 (0.2186) 85.4608 (0.0000) 19.1961 (0.2586) 93.8763 (0.0000)
∗ (∗∗) Signiﬁcant at 1% (5%)
40